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The New European Automotive 
Industry
The expansion of the European Union 15
to include the new Member States was
both a symbolic moment and a practical
step in the redefinition of the European
automotive industry. Of course, the indus-
try had already spread beyond the bor-
ders of the EU15, most overtly and deci-
sively with the integration of the former
German Democratic Republic, but still the
accession of ten new Member States has
reinforced the shift in the centre of gravi-
ty of automotive production and markets.
In turn, this has raised questions in the old
industrial heartlands and particularly in
Germany where the automotive industry
is of such paramount economic impor-
tance. Can the European vehicle manu-
facturers continue to compete on the
world stage? Can the automotive indus-
try, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers
alike, resist the pull of low-cost produc-
tion locations? Will the ‘old Europe’ coun-
tries remain viable as places to build cars?
What will happen to the currently posi-
tive trade balance that the EU enjoys in
the automotive sector? Is the European
industry going to become a victim of reg-
ulation, social and environmental, or are
its troubles of its own making? Do we in
Europe actually need our own car indus-
try, or is it time to move on into activities
that are less capital intensive, less risky
and with higher returns?
Finding answers to some of the above
questions is the current task being set with
the European Commission, and also by
the vehicle manufacturers themselves
through ACEA. The industry position will
be clear enough, because ultimately it will
reduce down to that which all individual
vehicle manufacturers can agree on: that
it is government regulation, classic ‘red
tape’, that is strangling the proper oper-
ation of the market: manufacturers have
insufficient freedom of action because of
labour laws, etc. while consumers are be-
ing forced to pay vast premiums over and
above the true economic cost of motor-
ing by government taxes. The position
taken by the European Commission, and
indeed by other external analysts, may be
somewhat different: highlighting the con-
tribution made at national and EU level to-
wards R&D for example, or the ways in
which high social costs result in (among
other things) a skilled and productive
workforce.
This paper can only touch on those de-
bates in the brief space available. Rather,
two simple scenarios are presented to
consider the future of ‘Europe’, however
defined, as a production location for the
automotive industry. These scenarios are
termed the ‘cost reduction scenario’ and
the ‘value enhancement scenario’. It can
be seen that they lead to very different
conclusions.
The cost reduction scenario
The cost reduction scenario is premised
on an industry based on a linear value-
added chain of production in which raw
materials are transformed into customer
value through a series of sequential steps,
and where the market is expanded and/or
profits made through economies of scale,
capacity utilisation and cost reductions.
Notwithstanding the efforts of brand mar-
keting, the car is this scenario is a com-
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modity with low levels of differentiation between products.
In this scenario the older, inefficient plants or those produc-
ing product for which there is insufficient demand will close
following the pattern illustrated in Table 1. Eventually, all high-
volume production will be removed from the EU15.
In the 1990s plant closures included Renault Vilvoorde, Criel,
Billancourt, Valladolid, and Setubal; SEAT Barcelona; Volvo
Kalmar and Uddevalla; Lancia Desio and Chivasso; Fiat (In-
nocente) Lambrate; and MG Rover Cowley South. These
were not sufficient to redress poor levels of ca-
pacity utilisation in the industry as a whole.
Rather than assuage concerns over future
production in Europe, these plant closures
appear to have increased the pressure on
those remaining manufacturing locations. In
2004 other plants came under threat, includ-
ing Land Rover Solihull, Jaguar at Browns
Lane, the former Suzuki plant in Santander,
Spain, MGRover at Longbridge, and GM op-
erations in Opel Germany and Saab Trollhat-
ten. Other plants have faced pressure for sig-
nificant reductions in the workforce, for ex-
ample Nissan Barcelona and SEAT Martorell.
In all cases the complaints from senior man-
agement appear to be the same: the work-
force is not productive enough relative to
costs. Indeed, a feature of the last ten years
or so in the European automotive industry
has been the creation of novel working prac-
tices and shift patterns that seek to achieve
greater flexibility in the use of labour, and more
intensive use of the productive assets of the
plant. Alongside this, plants within the large,
multiple-plant vehicle manufacturers have to
compete for future investment rounds in a
practice that can result in one location being
‘played off’ against another.
Moreover, the ‘headline’ attention devoted
to the vehicle manufacturers has tended to
obscure the shift in production, already es-
tablished but still accelerating, by the sup-
ply base. This trend among the suppliers
started with the more labour-intensive op-
erations such as wiring harness assembly,
and has continued into many ‘commodity’
components and sub-assembly operations
such as simple stamping, casting, and plas-
tic moulding. Indeed, the situation is fast-de-
veloping whereby the only components op-
erations left in Europe are those associated
with final system assembly or are located
alongside the vehicle assembly plant to
achieve sequenced production. According
to some estimates, at least 100,000 manufacturing jobs have
been lost in the German automotive supply sector as a re-
sult of relocation. The other side to this scenario is growth
in production in Central and Eastern Europe, as Table 2 il-
lustrates.
If all the planned investments and existing plants work at
full capacity, by 2010 car production could be over 4 million
units in Central and Eastern Europe. Markets in the region,
though growing, are unlikely to expand in line, with the re-
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Table 1
Example plant closures and capacity reductions in Western Europe
from 2000
Year Country Location Nature of closure
2003 Belgium Antwerp GM Opel. Reduction of
capacity from 400,000 to
264,000
2002 France Romorantin Loss of Espace production
by Matra (70,000/yr)
2004 Netherlands Born Reduction of NedCar 
capacity from 280,000 to
250,000 (Smart)
2002 UK Dagenham Closure of assembly plant
(cap: 300,000/yr)
2001 UK Luton Closure of Vauxhall
assembly
2001 Italy Rivalta Closure of Fiat plant
2000 Portugal Azambuja Closure of Ford plant
Table 2
Key investments in Central and Eastern Europe from 2000
Year Country Location Nature of investment
2005 Czech
Republic
Kolin Full scale Toyota / PSA car 
assembly plant, small car 
(cap: 300,000/yr)
2001 Poland Former Daewoo assembly plant
2006/7 Slovakia Zilina Full scale car Hyundai / Kia
assembly plant
(cap: 200,000/yr)
2006 Slovenia Novo Mesto Refurbished Renault Plant
(cap: 220,000/yr)
2006 Slovakia Trnava PSA plant (cap: 300,000/yr)
2004 Slovakia Bratislava VW (Skoda) expansion to
300,000/yr
2005 Ukraine Uschgorod VW (Skoda) expansion to
40,000/yr kit assembly
2005 Romania Pitesti Renault refurbishment of Dacia
factory to produce Logan
2008 Hungary or 
Czech
Republic
Daihatsu looking for a
production location
2002 Russia Moscow Renault take-over of former 
Moskvich plant, to produce
Logan model (cap: 60,000/yr) in
2005Spring Conference
sult that a high proportion of output will come back to the
EU15, putting further pressure on existing plants. The over-
all market in the EU15 is broadly stagnant, at least in unit
terms although there may be scope for growth in value terms.
Emerging controls over car usage, in city centres in partic-
ular, along with the likely increase in costs arising from the
need to meet carbon dioxide reduction targets do not bode
well for further market growth.
In the long run, the industry continues to drift eastward,
and that in the EU15 declines to a residual rump – perhaps
salvaged by a relatively buoyant and export-based prestige
sector as discussed below. Other activities such as R&D
might remain in the traditional locations, but even in the
case of these highly skilled workers there is an emerging
supply in Central and Eastern Europe.
The value enhancement scenario
This scenario probably has two aspects. The first is the con-
centration on high value, diverse and customised vehicles
built to order. The second is the emergence of alternative
production/retail structures that allow ‘usership’ rather than
ownership.
It is often forgotten that there has been significant invest-
ment over recent years in the EU15. Often, investments
relate to the refurbishment or extension of existing plants.
In some cases, such as the MINI plant at Oxford or the
Maserati plant in Italy, an existing plant is virtually ‘born
again’ and these plants can be considered new. In other
cases, such as the new paint shop in the Ferrari plant in
Modena, a vital bottleneck is removed. Such investments
are of course vital to the continuing competitiveness of any
plant and in reality form the overwhelming majority of all
investments undertaken. Other investments in, for exam-
ple, engine production or R&D facilities, or novel develop-
ments such as the VW Autostadt in Wolfsburg are of im-
portance too, though space does not allow them to be
considered here.
Equally, there have been completely new
plants built in Europe over recent years, as
Table 4 illustrates. Moreover, these plants are
hardly tucked away into the low-cost en-
claves of places like Portugal.
There has been a clear revival of the ‘super-
luxury’ sector, a part of the industry for which
Europe has no real rivals. It could be argued
that this boutique sector has little eco-
nomic relevance in the greater automotive in-
dustry, and there is some merit in this view.
Along with this has come the (largely) con-
tinued prosperity and competitive success
of the ‘prestige’ producers (Mercedes, BMW,
Audi, Porsche, Volvo, Saab, Jaguar, Land
Rover) whose strategies owe as much to dif-
ferentiation and cost recovery as they do to
cost reduction. Aided by the environmental-
ly-forced innovation process, overall this sec-
tor could lead the transformation of the core
technologies of the industry into light-weight
structures and alternative power sources. In
this regard it is of some concern that the
Japanese automotive industry, and in partic-
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Table 3
Car production, 2002 and 2010














New plants in Europe, 1995 onward: an illustrative list
Year Country Location Nature of investment
1998 France Hambach MCC Smart production facility
(cap: 200,000/yr)
1997 France Valenciennes Toyota assembly facility (cap:
180,000/yr)
2001 UK Oxford MINI plant by BMW
1999 UK Halewood Jaguar X-Type assembly
plant
2003 UK Goodwood New Rolls-Royce plant by
BMW
2001 Germany Dresden VW plant to produce Phaeton
model (low volume)
2003 Germany Leipzig Porsche Cayenne and
Carrera GT plant (low
volume)
2005 Germany Leipzig BMW plant (cap: 300,000/yr)
2000 Germany Stuttgart Maybach plant within
Mercedes Sindelfingen.
2002 UK Gaydon Aston Martin plant, 5000 per 
year.Spring Conference
ular Toyota, has been so forthright in the deployment of
petrol-electric hybrid technologies so securing valuable learn-
ing, as well association in the market with environmental
leadership. Where the European industry has done well is
in novel vehicle architectures, and in build to order systems
embracing high levels of product variety articulated through
sophisticated ‘customer relationship management’ systems.
This latter point could be vital to resist ‘long range’ imports
of relatively undifferentiated and low-cost product from places
such as China and India. Again this question of product va-
riety proliferation is an aspect of production strategy and
product design that requires careful consideration, both from
a technical perspective (i.e. how is it to be achieved) but al-
so from a brand perspective. Already the industry is trying
to shift from the rather static and illusory concept of plat-
forms, towards the more elastic and three-dimensional con-
cept of architectures in the creation of new models and
variants. There is at least short-term evidence that the shift
into higher value market segments by some brands has met
with resistance (VW), while the search for higher volume
has proved problematic for others (Jaguar; Mercedes) and
the development of new brands has been expensive (Smart,
MINI). Others have so far been successful (Porsche, BMW)
in growing volume without diluting brand equity, but it is
potentially a high-risk strategy.
Beyond this, there appears to be growing pressure for a new
business model in Europe, one that does away with ‘fire and
forget’ production. An example is the Indego concept, re-
cently revealed by ATKearney and the former CEO of Ford
Europe. This concept seeks to combine some of the as-
pects of the globalisation of production, in for example im-
porting engines and other components from China, with lo-
calisation of final assembly and marketing through micro fac-
tories that are also the point of sale, service and product
support. An important element in these emerging concepts
is that the ownership of the vehicle is retained by the man-
ufacturer, and that it can then be returned to the local mi-
cro factory for periodic ‘refresh’ treatments before being
leased to another customer. In other words, the future of the
European automotive industry rests on innovation: not just
technical but also organisational, with new ways of deliver-
ing customer value. These types of business models can-
not easily be displaced by global production, because the
local element is integral to the delivery of customer value,
while they simultaneously reduce the capital requirements
of the business and therefore improve the returns on in-
vestment.
Conclusions
Ultimately, the likely outcome is a continued fracturing of
the market for automobility, with differing customer needs
being met in differing ways. Presently, the greatest pres-
sure appears to be on the volume producers that, with low
per-unit margins, are most exposed by both high unit costs
and market fragmentation accentuated by reduced product
life cycles. Of course there are exceptions, but in a stag-
nant market one vehicle manufacturer can only gain vol-
ume at the expense of another. Recently, the volume ‘win-
ners’ have been PSA and Renault (with much of their suc-
cess attributable to aesthetic design issues) while the ‘losers’
have been Ford, GM Opel, VW, and Fiat. The specialist or
premium producers have effectively been cushioned by a
strong US market where issues such as fuel consumption
count for little. This bubble economy cannot last, and it is
not at all clear that the European premium producers are in
a position to survive a large-scale drop in US demand. 
The real challenge will be to create an industry that in all re-
spects is more sustainable than that which we have now:
ironically, being in a highly regulated Europe is going to be
an advantage there. Indeed, there is a strong case for sug-
gesting that the divergence of opinion between the Euro-
pean Commission and the industry is misplaced, and that
the ultimate competitiveness of the industry will be improved
and enhanced by stronger regulatory controls. In other
words, both the industry and the European Commission
have much to benefit from greater regulation, and that as a
result the European automotive industry should actively em-
brace issues such as the reduction of carbon dioxide emis-
sions and the recycling of end of life vehicles. A strategy of
resistance and denial will only become counter-productive.
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